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RAPE, AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT TO SEX, AND SEXUAL 
AUTONOMY: INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM 
Jane Campbell Moriarty∗ 
The time is now propitious, as he guesses, 
The meal is ended, she is bored and tired, 
Endeavours to engage her in caresses 
Which are still unreproved, if undesired. 
Flushed and decided, he assaults at once; 
Exploring hands encounter no defence; 
His vanity requires no response, 
And makes a welcome of indifference.1 
 
We may have moved in the West toward a standard in which “no 
means no” has the force of criminal law behind it.  But are we ready for 
a standard in which only “yes means yes?”  And if so, getting to yes may 
be a winding path to follow.  The concept of consent, some of the 
symposium authors note, is a far more complicated inquiry than many 
appreciate.  Consider the Eliot quotation above: is it consensual if his 
exploring hands encounter no defense?  Is indifference sufficient to 
establish consent and if not, should his act be considered criminal rather 
than just boorish? This is only one, among many, questions with which 
the symposium authors grapple. 
This symposium, composed of international scholars, originated 
from two presentations at the Law and Society Conference in Berlin, 
Germany in July, 2007.  Each group focused its presentations on the 
thorny issues arising from determining when sex is the product of free 
choice, when it is the result of force, and the legal and philosophical 
implications arising from those issues.  Subsequently, the Akron Law 
Review decided that the subjects of the Berlin Conference would make 
∗Professor, University of Akron School of Law.  
 1. T.S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS, 1909-1950 (Harcourt, 
Brace & World 1952). 
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an interesting and topical Symposium.  They invited the authors from the 
conference, along with a few other professors, to write for this edition. 
To introduce this Symposium, I first discuss the issues related to 
the crime of rape, the idea of sexual autonomy, and the concept of 
affirmative consent to sex.  Then, I briefly summarize the symposium 
authors’ various approaches to these topics. 
To echo Donald Dripps’ sentiment, rape is an exceptional crime, 
one treated differently than other serious crimes.2 There are many 
reasons for this exceptionalism.  The historical burdens on rape victims 
to prove a rape occurred were unusual, draconian, and substantial.3  It is 
only in the last several decades that the law has changed to bring rape 
into line with burdens approximating other crimes.4  The exceptionalism 
may also arise from the complicated nature of sex: when engaged in 
voluntarily, sex may be a delightful, perhaps even transcendent 
experience.5  In stark contraposition, sex against one’s will is a horrific 
experience—a most brutal crime of violence.6  Indeed, rape in war has 
been termed a form of torture.7  Rape is not unbidden physical affection; 
it is the violent use of person against her will with no regard for her 
personal desires.8 
Further complicating the crime of rape is the development of two 
distinct categories of rape: what some ironically call “real rape,” where 
 2. See Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution 
of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON  L. REV.  957 (2008).  See also Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L. J. 
1087, 1095 (1986)(discussing how the definition of nonconsent is unique in law). 
 3. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 960-66 (citing MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF 
THE CROWN 628, 628-35 (1646)). 
 4. Id.  For a detailed discussion of some of the rape reforms, see  Meredith J. Duncan, Sex 
Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line Between Forcible Rape and Non-
Consensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1095-1108 (2007). 
 5. See, e.g., JOHN DONNE, The Ecstasy, in JOHN DONNE: THE MAJOR WORKS 121, 121-23 
(1990). 
 6. Estrich, supra note 2, at 1087.  (“Eleven years ago, a man held an ice pick to my throat 
and said ‘Push over, shut up, or I’ll kill you.’  . . . A hundred years later, I jumped out of my car as 
he drove away.”).  See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE, 347-
74 (1975) (recounting rape narratives from victims). 
 7. See Hannah Pearce, An Examination of the International Understanding of Political Rape 
and the Significance of Labeling it Torture, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 534, 540-41 (2002) (discussing 
how the United Nations Convention Against Torture recognized rape as a form of torture during 
prosecutions involving the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda).  For further discussion about rape 
during wartime, see BROWNMILLER, supra note 6, at 31-113. 
 8. See generally Pearce, supra note 7.  “It is not passion or lust gone wrong.  It is first and 
foremost an act of aggression with a sexual manifestation.”  Pearce, supra note 7, at 534 (quoting 
Catherine Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape:  Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia,  17 HUM. RTS. Q. 649, 650 n.4 (1995)). 
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the victim is attacked by a stranger,9 and acquaintance rape, where the 
victim knows the attacker.10  While many scholars and rape researchers 
recognize that acquaintance rape is by far more common than stranger 
rape,11 and often equally horrific for the victim,12 prosecutors often 
decline to bring such cases for fear they cannot be won.13 
For somewhat apparent reasons, proving the crime when it occurs 
between acquaintances is particularly fraught with difficulty since the 
defense raised is generally one of consent.  Whom to believe?  The legal, 
moral, philosophical, and practical implications of determining whether 
sex was voluntary or criminal are daunting.  The competing 
considerations between fairness to both accused and victimized are 
substantial and difficult to resolve.  What happens when the parties were 
drinking?  Was consent legally possible?  Was consent, or lack thereof, 
properly understood?  Does anyone have an accurate recall of the events 
that occurred at the time in question?  And additionally, the old standard 
rape myths—she shouldn’t have gone home with him, women lie about 
rape, women are irresponsible temptresses, she must have wanted it if 
she was drinking with him14—affect prosecutorial decisions to bring 
cases and influence juror’s decisions about such cases.  All of these 
concerns and more are discussed in the symposium articles. 
Among the first problems is the question of defining rape.  Should 
 9. Estrich, supra note 2, at 1088 (explaining how the police considered the attack that she 
suffered while exiting her car one night a “real rape”).  See also SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 11 
(1987); Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625, 625-28 (2005) 
(discussing the two standards). 
 10. See Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Rape 
Victimization: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. 
SPECIAL REPORT (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, D.C.), Jan. 2006, at 21 available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf (distinguishing between stranger and acquaintance 
rape).  The latter includes relatives, spouses, and acquaintances.  Id. 
 11. See Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 10 (noting that the vast majority of women who are 
raped by force or threat of force (83.3%) are victimized by someone they know—including 
relatives, spouses, and acquaintances).  This survey only includes rapes accomplished with force or 
threat of force.  Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1415-17 
(2005) (discussing the psychological harm that acquaintance rape can cause). 
 13. See Dripps, supra note 2, at Section III (Why the Return to Consent Won’t Normalize 
Rape Law).  See Aviva Ornstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 
1590 (2007) (discussing how prosecutors winnow out weak cases from the system); Lisa Frohmann, 
Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender Ideologies in 
Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 531, 531 (1997) (discussing ethnographic data 
from prosecutors on convictability in sexual assault cases). 
 14. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 972 (discussing the myth of “justified rape”).  For a fuller 
discussion of the classic rape myths, see Morrison Torrey, When Will We be Believed? Rape Myths 
and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1013, 1025-31 (1991). 
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the definition of rape require proof of force/threat of force, or should it 
only require proof that the sex was against one’s consent?  As the 
symposium authors discuss, the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom each vary in their approaches.  The Sexual Offences Act 2003, 
enacted in England and Wales, defines rape as non-consensual sex in 
which the defendant does not reasonably believe in consent.15  
Currently, United States rape statistics include only forcible rapes,16 
although some U.S. jurisdictions have changed the standard to eliminate 
the force requirement and to define rape as unconsented-to-sex.17  
Canada has gone further than most U.S. jurisdictions, moving toward a 
requirement that “only yes means yes.”18 The somewhat western 
movement toward a consent standard has generated a great deal of 
scholarship—and the authors in this symposium have various 
approaches to th
Another issue the writers in this Symposium tackle is whether, in 
consent-only jurisdictions, the consent must be verbal or may be 
assumed from silence or from actions. Should the law impose upon 
women the obligation to speak up and say “no”, or should the law 
impose upon men the obligation to first hear the word “yes”?  Requiring 
a man to obtain verbal consent, some scholars muse, comes close to 
criminalizing normal sexual behavior.19  Many other scholars in this 
symposium agree with requiring affirmative consent. 
The emergence of the so-called “hooking up culture”—where 
young adults (often college students) meet at bars or parties, drink to 
excess, and then go off to have a single night of sex together—has 
created a whole new set of complicated problems for the law, social 
science researchers, and legal theorists.20  Has the culture changed so 
 15. See Vanessa E. Munro, Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating 
Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 923, 935-947 (2008) 
(discussing the Sexual Offences Act 2003). 
 16. See Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 10. 
 17. See Nicholas J. Little, Note, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational 
Results of an Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1341-44 (2005). 
 18. See Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: 
Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 869 (2008). 
 19. See Richard Klein, Am Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrating 
Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981 (2008); Dan Subotnik, Copulemus in 
Pace: A Meditation on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex, and Sexual Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
847 (2008). 
 20. See, e.g., William Flack, Jr. et al, Risk Factors and Consequences of Unwanted Sex 
Among University Students: Hooking Up, Alcohol, and Stress Response, 22 J. OF INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE, 139, 139-41 n.2 (2007) (describing the concept of “hooking up”); Subotnik, supra note 
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substantially that current legal concepts of consent do not fit with the 
culture’s behavior?  Moreover, while it turns out that both young men 
and women are engaging in this type of sexual behavior with some 
degree of willingness, stereotypes of men-as-studs and women-as-sluts 
continue to inform the collective consciousness of these young people.21  
The writers of this symposium address the effects of persistent 
stereotypes and lay-person conceptions on legal decisions.22 
Another stereotype that informs the law suggests that men are 
entitled, consistent with “tradition,” to continue pursuing sex unless and 
until a woman says no or physically resists.  This conception of woman 
as gatekeeper of virtue imagines a being who is passive up till the 
minute she resists.  Is this a realistic view of how women behave?  And, 
indeed, in asking these questions, have we conflated voluntary sexual 
activity with the violent crime of rape?   
Yet, some scholars accurately note that even with the affirmative 
consent standard, both judicial and societal standards seem to demand 
the “ideal” victim—one who is responsible, security conscious, and 
careful to minimize her own risk.23  The theme of women as 
irresponsible and in part to blame for their own rapes seems to arise 
anytime women drink, are overly flirtatious, or accompany men without 
chaperones.24  Yet, is it reasonable, or indeed fair, for the law to expect 
women to engage in risk avoidance so that they do not become crime 
victims?  Does this again turn the law on its head and provide another 
way of reformulating women as “gatekeepers of their virtue”?  Or 
perhaps it merely recognizes the reality of adults assuming partial 
responsibility for their own decision-making. 
Are women temptresses?  Passive or assertive in setting 
boundaries?  Sexual recipients rather than sexual aggressors?  Chaste or 
slutty?  In need of protection or considered as equal participants?  Do 
women want sex or simply put up with it?  The duality assumed in these 
questions often defines the contours and boundaries of rape law.  Law 
and society’s consideration of women-as-sexualized-beings often 
19, at 852-53 (discussing KATHLEEN A. BOGLE, HOOKING UP, SEX, DATING AND RELATIONSHIPS 
ON CAMPUS (N.Y.U. Press 2008)).   
 21. See Dripps, supra note 2, at 970. 
 22. Compare Gotell, supra note 18, and Sharon Cowan, The Trouble with Drink: 
Intoxication, (In)capacity, and the Evaporation of Consent to Sex, 41 AKRON L. REV. 899 (2008) 
with Dripps, supra note 2. 
 23. See, e.g., Gotell, supra note 18, at 878-79. 
 24. Gotell, supra note 18, at 879.  See Dripps, supra note 2, at 972-73; Cowan, supra note 22, 
at 906. 
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demand a virtuous, nearly flawless victim for the crime of rape to be 
taken seriously. 
Dan Subotnik’s article provides a critique of the affirmative consent 
doctrine, questioning whether it is a necessary or desirable change to the 
law of rape, particularly at a time when women seem to enjoy more 
sexual power than at any other time in history.  Professor Subotnik’s 
provocative argument considers the writing of sexually autonomous 
women, posing an alternative view of feminist sex, where women are 
powerful and in control of their sexuality. Subotnik’s research reveals 
that a random sampling of female students do not fear rape to the degree 
that many feminist scholars believe; an interesting and possibly 
counterintuitive concept.  Nonetheless, data suggest that the lack of fear 
may be misguided: according to extrapolations from the National 
Violence Against Women Survey conducted by the United States 
Department of Justice, one in six women will be forcibly raped.25 
By contrast, Lise Gotell’s article, delving into the Canadian law, 
explains how the affirmative and specific consent standard works and 
yet how the most vulnerable of women—the aboriginal, the homeless 
and the addicted—are still victimized both by rape and the interpretation 
of law.  Far from viewing women as sexually autonomous and powerful, 
Professor Gotell provides a view of how women are now obligated to 
avoid “risky behavior,” and to prevent the rape from occurring. 
“[C]onsistency, rationality, and risk-avoidance” she writes “constitute 
new markers of normative conduct against which the behaviors and 
credibility of actual complainants are measured and assessed.”26 
Dr. Sharon Cowan’s article concerns the problem of intoxicated 
consent, focusing on United Kingdom cases, statutes, and policy.  Dr. 
Cowan first examines the nature of consent, explaining the problems that 
flow from defining consent as either a function of mind (mens rea) or a 
function of physicality (acting or speaking as to convey permission).  
She suggests that the more accurate approach is not to separate mind 
from body but to consider both together.  Nonetheless, the intoxicated 
victim poses a particular challenge in terms of defining consent.  Dr. 
Cowan proposes more guidance for judges and juries on both the nature 
of intoxication and the problems of determining capacity to consent. 
Vanessa Munro explains the philosophic and legal construction of 
the concept of consent.  She argues that contemporary interpretations 
often fail to appreciate that women’s consent, like that of workers in 
 25. Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 10, at 7. 
 26. Gotell, supra note 18, at 881. 
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exploitive employment practices, may arise from necessity rather than 
free will.  She describes the development of the Sexual Offences Act 
2003, used in England and Wales, and considers both the merits and 
shortcomings of the Act in light of her underlying philosophical 
analysis.  Professor Munro concludes that while the Act has much merit, 
additional legislative intervention, further judicial instructions, and 
education for juries on rape myths would result in more just conclusions. 
Donald Dripps’ article expresses concern that while the “elite,”—
the legal and academic communities—continue to rework and refine 
rape law to make it easier to prosecute difficult, but potentially valid 
cases, juries refuse to convict in many of these same cases.  Tracing the 
development of consent-only statutes in the law, he concludes that such 
a change will not normalize the law of rape because juries will still 
continue to be strongly influenced by firmly-held stereotypes that 
women who drink or who engage in flirtatious behavior are not 
blameless victims.  Citing research, he states that “[p]opular opinion, 
confronted with a sexually active man and a sexually active woman, sees 
not two morally equivalent hedonists, but a stud and a slut.”27  The 
solution Professor Dripps devises is to create new statutes for sex-
without-consent, which would provide misdemeanor-only jail time.  This 
approach would allow these cases to be tried without juries.  He 
recognizes that this solution poses numerous concerns but emphasizes 
that it provides some very concrete benefits. 
Richard Klein considers affirmative consent in the context of the 
dramatic evidentiary changes in rape law, explaining the history of the 
legal development of the law in great detail.  He concludes that when the 
changes to the law of rape are considered in their totality, the move 
toward affirmative consent is both unnecessary and unfair to defendants. 
Specifically, Professor Klein discusses the reduction in proof required to 
establish rape and the creation of a rape shield defense.  Particularly 
pernicious, he argues, is the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 413, 
which permits the prosecution to introduce not only prior convictions for 
rape but also an unprosecuted complaint for prior sexual assaults.  In 
addition, Professor Klein expresses concern that many rape cases have 
included somewhat questionable social science in the form of rape 
trauma syndrome evidence.  This evidence is often introduced only to 
provide an explanation for behaviors alleged to be associated with rape, 
yet its very generality invites the jury to infer that this person was 
 27. Dripps, supra note 2, at 971. 
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raped—even though the expert never so testified.  It is thus quite 
prejudicial but nearly impossible to effectively counter. 
Kerri Lynn Stone’s article focuses on the recidivist offender in the 
context of sexual harassment, explaining the contours of employer 
liability in those cases and providing a new framework for imposing 
liability.  Professor Stone argues that pursuant to current United States 
Supreme Court law, employers can escape liability for serial sexual 
harassers by moving the harasser to a different part of the company, 
where he is free to harass, but the newly-harassed employee cannot sue 
successfully.  To correct this problem, she urges courts to analyze these 
cases with an eye toward whether a harasser is a repeat offender—rather 
than focusing on whether the woman is a first-time victim. 
The symposium participants offer thoughtful, interesting, and, 
indeed, challenging suggestions for resolving the many questions and 
concerns that the topics of rape, affirmative consent to sex, and sexual 
autonomy pose.  
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